However, as American casualties increased throughout the conflict since 1965, American support for the war deteriorated and in the fall of 1972 the Nixon administration came under intense pressure to withdraw from the war. As a result, the United States exerted strong diplomatic pressure on its South Vietnamese ally to sign the peace treaty, even though the concessions Thiu wanted could not be obtained. Nixon promised to continue to provide substantial assistance to South Vietnam and, given his recent victory in the presidential election, it seemed possible that he could keep that promise. To demonstrate his seriousness towards Thiu, Nixon ordered the bombing of Operation Linebacker II in northern Vietnam in December 1972. Nixon also attempted to strengthen the South Vietnamese armed forces by ordering that large quantities of U.S. military equipment and equipment be returned to South Vietnam from May to December 1972 under Operation Enhance and Enhance Plus.  These operations should also keep North Vietnam at the negotiating table and prevent them from abandoning negotiations and aspiring to total victory. When the North Vietnamese government agreed to resume “technical” talks with the United States, Nixon on December 30 ordered an end to bombing north of the 20th parallel. With the United States pledging to withdraw (and after Nixon`s threats that the South Vietnamist would be abandoned if he did not agree), Ertin had little choice but to join. The overall weakness of the various peace agreements before Abuja II was not to include effective “cost-increasing” provisions (Mattes and Savun 2009). Although all peace agreements required warring factions to comply with their rules, there were no clear provisions to punish violators. The fundamental effect has been the creation of a “culture of impunity” in which the various belligerents, in particular the NPFL, have continued to violate the provisions of the various peace agreements, including ceasefire signs, without facing ECOWAS sanctions.
Therefore, in the absence of costs for violating the provisions of the various peace agreements, the warring factions were encouraged to display them. The peace treaty was chosen in two versions, one in Egyptian hieroglyphics and the other in Akkadian with cuneiform writing; Both versions survive. Such bilingual registration is common to many subsequent contracts. However, the treaty is different from the others because the two language versions are written differently. Although most of the text is identical, the hittitic version claims that the Egyptians were prosecuted for peace, and the Egyptian version claims otherwise. The contract was given to the Egyptians in the form of a silver plate, and the “pocket book” version was brought back to Egypt and carved in the Temple of Karnak. In particular, the practice of recurrent appeasement has been demonstrated in two ways. The power-sharing agreements in the various peace agreements have rewarded the creation of warring factions. This was done by assigning different ministries, authorities and public authorities to the various warring factions. In addition, larger percentages of government units have been attributed to powerful warring factions such as the NPFL. In return, the various warlords, such as “Tammy Bosses” (Lowenkopf 1976), appointed members of their respective factions to these posts.
This has allowed the warlords to wield enormous power in the various transitional governments. Finally, on the basis of the Liberian case, according to the model of the peace agreement, there are several valuable lessons that, at present and in the future, could be learned and applied to peace-making activities in other African and world countries. Another topic is the dynamics of conflict. In other words, it is important to look at the state or phase of the conflict in which a peace agreement is signed. This is important because the dynamics influence the behaviour of the parties to the conflict, especially their motivations for signing the agreement.